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ABSTRACT: Italy has experienced a double political phenomenon over the last few decades: a transfer 
of powers to a supranational entity like the EU and a move towards regional autonomy. This paper 
aims to evaluate how policy competences are attributed to and exercised by the European, national and 
regional institutions. It develops a set of quantitative indicators analysing the legislative production of 
the EU, the Italian parliament and the Italian regions in various policy areas. The main findings indicate 
a  certain substitutability between European and national legislation  and that different levels of 
government share competences in a larger number of sectors than suggested by the economic theory.   
 
JEL classification: H11, H77, P16 
 
                                                  




Over the last few decades, a double tendency has characterised some European States: the transfer 
of certain powers to a supranational entity like the European Union (EU), on the one side, and a move 
towards regional autonomy, on the other. Italy represents a very interesting case in this respect, 
because, besides being  one of the founding members of the EU, it implemented a process of 
decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. 
Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the 
regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if 
then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy 
perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Tabellini 2003a,b, Alesina and Perotti 
2004, Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough 
constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other 
things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, 
education and local police.   
The goal of this paper is empirical. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent 
influential article by Alesina et al.(2005), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, 
legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop  a set of quantitative indicators 
measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions1 
from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the 
following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what 
extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually 
exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exercise consistent with the normative recommendations 
from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? 
 The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and 
national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. 
Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst 
social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are 
more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly 
involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very   3 
questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by 
the economic theory. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the framework for our analysis, 
drawing on the normative recommendations for the optimum degree of centralisation or 
decentralisation of competences suggested by the economic literature on integration and disintegration 
processes and fiscal federalism. Section 3 describes the rules governing the actual allocation of policy 
tasks among the EU, the Italian State and the Italian regions. Section 4 introduces the empirical 
analysis by discussing the relation between national legislation, on the one side, and European and 
regional ones, on the other. Section 5 presents our indicators measuring various aspects of the 
involvement of the three level of governments in different policy sectors. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A simple framework: "who should do what?" 
 
The recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes provides a useful 
framework for a discussion about the optimum allocation of policy competences among different levels 
of governments.2 Alesina et al. (2001, 2005a) analyse the determinants of the degree of centralisation 
and the size of international unions by modelling a union as a group of countries deciding together on 
the provision of public goods or policies which produce a spillover effect across members. Bolton and 
Roland (1997) employ heterogeneity in economic fundamentals (income or productivity) and 
distortionary taxation to study the conditions under which a majority in favour of secession (or 
unification) arises in the regions of a democratic country. 
These papers focus on a basic trade-off between the benefits of centralisation, arising from 
economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonising policies as a consequence of the 
heterogeneity of preferences, which suggest decentralisation of policy tasks. The normative 
conclusions imply that competence in areas with large economies of scale and relevant externalities to 
be internalised should be attributed to a supranational level of government, whilst sectors whose 
dominant feature is heterogeneity of preferences should be of national or local competence. These ideas 
are also related to theories of fiscal federalism, pioneered by Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and 
Oates (1972).3 Fiscal federalism, however, is especially relevant when discussing about allocation of 
competences between national and sub-national levels of government (thus leaving aside the 
supranational level), because it emphasises the roles of individual mobility and fiscal transfers, which 
are both much larger inside a single country than in an international union like the EU.   4 
The application of the theoretical principles outlined above to the real world first requires a 
classification of policy areas. Throughout the paper we will follow that proposed by Alesina et al. 
(2005b), which presents the advantages of being quite simple and broadly consistent with existing data 
sources, and identify the following nine policy categories (some of them are further split into sub-
categories in order to obtain more homogeneous policy sectors): 
International trade: it includes external trade provisions; 
Common Market: this area encompasses all the provisions aimed at promoting the free movement of 
goods, services, capital and people inside the EU, and at harmonising or establishing mutual acceptance 
of national norms; 
Money and Fiscal: this broad chapter covering economic policy is divided into two sub-categories. 
Money and macro policy concerns monetary and macroeconomic policy, including budgets. Taxation 
refers to provisions concerning direct and indirect taxation; 
Education, research and culture: this category encompasses a wide range of policies, including also 
youth policies, tourism and sport;   
Environment: it includes protection of the environment and measures against pollution;  
Sectoral business relations: this broad area is further split into three sub-categories: Agriculture and 
fisheries, Industry and energy, Transport; 
Non-sectoral business relations: it includes competition policy, undertaking laws and state aid; 
International relations: this chapter encompasses foreign policy (except for commercial policy), 
defence and foreign aid;  
Citizen and social protection: this area covers a wide range of policies and therefore is divided into 
three sub-categories: Justice and migration (including home affairs, civil rights and fight against crime) 
Health, employment and social protection (including consumer protection), Regional aid. 
<Table 1 here> 
The normative insights about the allocation of competences among different levels of government 
from the economic literature are summarised in Table 1, with the caveat that inevitably judgements on 
such issue are quite tentative and include a certain degree of subjectivity. For a more detailed 
discussion see Alesina et al. (2005b) and the extensive survey by Breuss and Eller (2004). 
Firstly, there exists a group of competencies which should be attributed to only one level of 
government. Among them, the areas of International trade and Common Market should quite clearly be 
assigned to the EU; consequently the EU should have exclusive competence in Non-sectoral business 
relations too, since the maintenance of different national regulations about competition policy or state   5 
aid could distort the functioning of the Single Market. On the contrary, Agriculture and fisheries, 
Industry and energy, Regional aid should be assigned to the national level, because they do not provide 
public goods on an international scale (the first two policy sectors) or because of large heterogeneity of 
preferences (the last sector). 
Secondly, some competences should be shared among different levels of government. Environment, 
Transport and Justice and migration may reasonably involve the EU, the Member States and the 
regions, because they present some effects of scale or some kind of externalities calling for EU-wide 
action (for instance, problems of global warming, international transportation and communication 
network, international crime), but have also a clear national or local dimension (think of preservation of 
environmental heritage, national or local transportation network, local crime). International relations  
shows significant economies of scale and externalities to be exploited at the EU level (especially in the 
defence sector), but also preference heterogeneity because of different national geo-political interests; 
therefore both the EU and the Member States should probably have competence on such policy area. 
Finally, in a certain number of policy sectors the optimal allocation of competences is quite 
controversial and hotly debated in the literature. This is the case for Money and fiscal, Education, 
research and culture and Health, employment and social protection. The first has been the subject of a 
long debate concentrating on the benefits and costs of centralisation of monetary policy at the EU level 
in the light of the theory of Optimum Currency Area (Mundell 1961, De Grauwe 2003) and of 
coordination of national fiscal policies (Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998, Brunila et al. 2001); another 
issue in this field concerns the assignment of taxing powers to the different levels of government 
according to the principles of fiscal federalism. The second policy area presents heterogeneous national 
or local preferences and limited externalities as regards educational and cultural matters, but it has been 
pointed out that there exists economies of scale in research and development which might call for a 
supranational intervention (Hoeller et al. 1996). The last category is characterised by large differences 
in the level of protection offered by national welfare systems, which have led many authors to identify 
different 'European social models' (Sapir 2005). Heterogeneous preferences also provide a strong 
argument in favour of decentralisation at the sub-national level; however, a role for the EU has 
sometimes been advocated with a view to avoiding the risk of social dumping, which could produce a 
negative externality between Member States (Persson et al. 1997). 
In order to provide a rough guide for our subsequent empirical analysis, we may argue that Money 
and macro policy should be shared between the EU and the Member States (with an obvious role for 
the sub-national governments in defining their own budgetary policy), whereas Taxation and Health,   6 
employment and social protection and Education, research and culture between the national and the 
sub-national levels. As regards the latter area, however, economies of scale in research activities 
suggest at least a supporting role for the EU in that field.  
 
 
3. The actual allocation of competences 
 
This section gives a concise presentation, only providing the essential background for our empirical 
analysis, of the actual allocation of competences between the EU and the Member States and between 
the State and the regions in Italy (for more details on the former, see Hix 2005, Nugent 2002; on the 
latter, see Rescigno 2005). 
The evolution of the EU’s policy responsibilities is shown in Table 2. It can be easily noted a 
pattern characterised by more and more competences assigned to the EU in an ever larger number of 
policy sectors, which have added to the Community’s original tasks (concerning international trade, 
common market and agriculture). Such transfer of competence has taken place over the last twenty 
years through the Single  European Act (1987), the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1999) and, to a lesser extent, the Nice Treaty (2003).4 
<Table 2 here> 
According to the European Constitution5 and the working documents of the European Convention 
which drafted it (European Convention 2002a,b), three categories of EU competence can be identified: 
exclusive, shared and complementary. The first confers the EU the exclusive right to legislate in a 
specific area; the Member States can only act to implement EU law. This category includes: customs 
union, competition rules for the internal market, monetary policy for the Euro area, common 
commercial policy and conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy. 
The second applies to areas in which 'the Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent 
that the Union has not exercised [...] its competence’ (Art. I-12). In other words, once the EU has 
adopted a legislative act, Member States may no longer legislate in the field covered by it and EU laws 
prevail over those of the Member States. Most policy areas fall into this category, including, among 
others,  agriculture and fisheries, internal market and environment. The third is defined as the 
'competence to carry out supporting, coordinating or complementary action' (Art. I -17); the EU's 
activity  cannot supersede Member States' competence nor entail harmonisation of their laws. Areas 
falling into this category are, for instance, industry, education and culture.   7 
The EU's activity has to conform to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. According to 
the former, the EU should not act unless its action is more effective than that taken at national, regional 
or local level. is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that 
constant checks are made as to whether any proposed action at the EU level is actually justified by 
reason of its scale or effects; however, subsidiarity does not apply to the areas falling into the EU’s 
exclusive competence. The latter states that any action by the EU should not go beyond what is 
essential to achieve the objectives envisaged in the Treaties. Nevertheless, since they are rather general, 
these principles are often difficult to translate into practice (Begg 1993; Berglof et al. 2003). 
The primary source of EU law is represented by the Treaties, which also identify the main legal 
instruments available to the EU institutions (secondary law). Here the classic division is between 
binding acts (regulations, directives and decisions) and non-binding acts (recommendations and 
opinions). As regards binding acts, both regulations and directives are of general scope, and are by their 
nature normative. The former are addressed directly to citizens and are binding in their entirety, 
whereas the latter are addressed to Member States and are binding with regard to the objective, but 
leave Member States the freedom to choose the appropriate legal instrument to achieve it.6 By contrast, 
a decision 'constitutes an individual act which is not of general scope' (European Convention 2002b, 
p.5): it is usually addressed to specific individuals, firms or countries and is binding in its entirety.  
The 1948 Italian Constitution provided for the formation of regions as autonomous entities with 
own powers and functions, but they were actually created only in 1970 and started to function in April 
1972 after a series of decrees had operated a first (and quite restrictive) transfer of competences, which 
was then widened and completed in 1977 by legislative decree 616/77 (Putnam 1993). There are two 
categories of regions: most of them (15 out of 20) are classified as "ordinary", while the other five are 
called "special", as they are granted a slightly larger degree of autonomy because of their  peculiar 
geographical and cultural characteristics.7  
The ordinary regions were given legislative power in policy areas falling into their competence, but 
all their laws had to respect the ‘fundamental principles’ established by state law and could not go 
against the ‘national interest’ or the interests of other regions. Therefore the regions had no exclusive 
competence in any matters; their legislative power always had to be shared with the State. In 2001, a 
constitutional reform changed such system.8 Now the Constitution provides a list of matters in which 
the State retains exclusive legislative competence, has enlarged the number of areas of shared 
competence (called ‘matters of concurrent legislation’) and attributes exclusive competence to the   8 
regions in all other matters. A detailed comparison between State and regional competences before and 
after 2001 is provided in Annex 1. 
Here we highlight the discrepancies between the actual allocation of competences among the EU, 
the Italian State and the Italian regions and the normative recommendations outlined above in Table 1. 
Table 3 shows that the policy responsibilities of the State are broadly in line with the theoretical 
prescriptions, except for Non-sectoral business relations, where its role does not seem justified. The 
EU has an excessively large role in Sectoral business relations and Citizen and social protection, even 
if this does not sound very surprising if some politico-economic reasons are taken into account. For 
instance, as regards Agriculture and fisheries, the Common Agricultural Policy was the first genuine 
European policy, put in place when the European Community was a net importer of food products and 
a large share of its workforce was still employed in agriculture, in order to guarantee food self-
sufficiency and a fair income to farmers (Tracy 1992). Another prominent example is Regional aid,  
where the role of the EU has found a political justification as a provider of side payments for those 
Member States supposed to be penalised from the completion of the Single Market and the creation of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (Allen 2000). With regard to the Italian regions, they can play a 
large role in  Money and macro policy (especially as regards banking and coordination of public 
finance) and have  also been granted (quite surprisingly) some responsibilities for International trade 
and International relations, where, according to the economic theory, they should have no competence 
at all.  
<Table 3 here> 
In all, each level of government seems to have an excessive number of competences and can thus 
act also in areas where its involvement is, at best, very questionable. However, what has been discussed 
so far is only the situation “on paper”, according to the European Treaties and the Italian Constitution. 
In section 5 below, we will investigate to what extent such competences are actually exercised. 
 
 
4. The evolution of legislative activity  
 
This section provides a general overview of the evolution of the legislative activity carried out by 
the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions, before moving to a sectoral analysis in the next section. 
First, we have to define what kinds of acts are to be included in our definition of “laws”. In order to   9 
make meaningful comparisons, for each level of government only the following categories of acts are 
taken into account:  
- Italy: ordinary laws passed by the Italian parliament (henceforth, the State); 
- EU: regulations and directives (decisions are excluded because they are not of general scope); 
- Regions: regional laws passed by both ordinary and special regions.  
All legislative acts passed by each level of government from 1973 (when the ordinary regions 
started to operate) to 2005 are counted, regardless of whether they are still into force or not. The split 
into three sub-periods in Table 4 shows that the number of state laws remained almost stable from 1973 
to the mid-1990s, then sensibly declined over the last decade. The opposite is true for the EU: just a 
slight increase in 1984-94 from the number registered in 1973-83, then a dramatic rise over the last 
decade. The pattern followed by regional laws is quite similar to that of state laws, even if their 
declining trend is smoother. If one looks at the ratio of EU to state laws and to that of regional to state 
laws, the former has been marked by a spectacular increase in the last sub-period (from 7.7 to 17.4), 
whilst the latter has not varied very significantly throughout the 1973-2005 period.  
<Table 4 here> 
The number of state laws is negatively correlated ( -0.41) with that of EU laws and positively 
correlated (0.40) with that of regional laws (Table 5). Therefore there appears to be a certain degree of 
substitutability between EU laws and state laws, while regional laws and state laws tend to  be 
complementary. The latter phenomenon may seem surprising at first sight, but can be accounted for if 
we consider the different characteristics and timing of the transfer of competences from the State to the 
supranational and sub-national levels respectively. In the former case, a certain number of policy areas 
are of exclusive competence of the EU and even when they are shared with Member States, EU 
legislation prevails over national ones; moreover, the transfer has been progressive but almost 
continuous during the last two decades, mainly through the 1987 Single European Act, the 1993 
Maastricht Treaty and the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty. Hence EU and state laws may be substitutes. 
In the latter case, on the contrary, over most of the period considered the ordinary regions had no 
exclusive competences and in areas of shared competence regional laws were submitted to the 
'fundamental principles' established by state laws; moreover, the process of transfer of competences 
was concentrated in a short time span (from 1972 to 1977), then no further increase in regional powers 
took place until the 2001 constitutional reform, which, however, is too recent to produce notable 
effects. These features thus explain why regional laws actually add to state ones, not substitute for 
them.   10 
May these statistical correlations imply a causal relationship between the annual number of EU and 
regional laws, on the one side, and the annual number of state laws, on the other? In other words, is the 
latter really influenced by the former? From the above discussion, we may suppose that the growing 
legislative activity of the EU does have played a role in reducing that of the State, whereas we should 
not expect any significant effect of the number of regional laws on that of state laws. 
Obviously, before testing econometrically these hypotheses, it must be noted that the number of 
state laws passed in a certain year should be influenced also by other factors; in particular, it should be 
lower in years where parliamentary elections take place,  which impose a few-month stop to the 
legislative activity. According to the Constitution, the two chambers of parliament are elected for five 
years, but, throughout the 1973-2005 period, early elections have been very frequent (they took place in 
1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1994 and 1996), whilst regular elections (at the end of a complete five-year 
term) were only held in 1992 and 2001. One may suppose that the negative impact of early elections on 
the number of laws is larger than that of regular elections, because in the former case, which usually 
takes place after a government crisis, the dissolution of parliament is not anticipated by the institutional 
actors, while in the latter they expect the dissolution of parliament and can adapt their behaviour 
accordingly (for instance, by intensifying their legislative production in the months prior to the 
dissolution). To test whether the number of EU laws and that of regional laws significantly affect the 
number of state laws after controlling for election years, we estimate the following two equations:9 
 
LAW_ITAt = a + ß1LAW_EUt + ß2LAW_REGt + ß3ELt + et               (1) 
LAW_ITAt = a + ß1LAW_EUt + ß2LAW_REGt + ß3EARLY_ELt + ß4REGULAR_ELt+ et               (2) 
t = 1973,...,2005 
where 
LAW_ITAt is the number of ordinary laws passed by the State in year t; 
LAW_EUt is the number of regulations and directives adopted by the EU in year t; 
LAW_REGt is the number of regional laws passed by the Italian regions in year t; 
ELt takes a value of 1 if parliamentary elections took place in Italy year t, 0 otherwise; 
EARLY_ELt takes a value of 1 if early parliamentary elections took place in Italy in year t, 0 
otherwise; 
REGULAR_ELt takes a value of 1 if regular parliamentary elections took place in Italy in year t, 0 
otherwise;   11 
et is the normally-distributed error term. 
<Tables 5 and 6 here> 
The two specifications explain respectively about 40 and 45 per cent of the variance of the 
dependent variable (Table 6). The Ljung-Box  Q-statistic shows no sign of autocorrelation of the 
residuals; this is not surprising, since the variables in the model do not have an economic nature. The 
coefficient of LAW_EU is negative and always highly significant, while that of LAW_REG is positive 
but not significant. However, their quantitative impact is fairly low. An increase of 100 in the annual 
number of EU laws implies a decrease of almost 3 in the annual number of state laws. The hypotheses 
on elections are fully corroborated by the data. According to specification (1), in an election year the 
Italian parliament approves on average 55 laws less than in a normal year, but equation (2) shows that 
this negative effect is much larger for early elections than for regular ones (-70 against -12) and is only 
significant in the former case. 
With the caveats that the number of available observations is necessarily quite limited, what 
conclusions can be drawn from these regressions? The progressive transfer of competences to and the 
consequent growing legislative activity of the EU actually seem to have contributed, albeit not to a very 
large extent, to the diminution of the legislative activity of the State. By contrast, the regions have 
played no role in it. As discussed above, from the late 1970s to the beginning of this century their 
policy competences did  not change and all of them were shared with the State; their legislative 
production has followed a pattern similar to that of the State, but, as expected, the statistical effect of 
the former on the latter is not significant.  
 
 
5. Sectoral breakdown of legislation 
 
We now proceed to analyse the sectoral distribution of all the legislative acts passed in the 1973-
2005 period by the  State, the EU and a sample of ordinary regions composed of the five most populous 
ones (Region-5): Lombardy, Campania, Lazio, Veneto and Piedmont, together accounting for 50% of 
the Italian population (29.5 million people out of 58.5 million).10 Laws are classified according to the 
policy categories defined in Section 2 above. For details on data sources, see Annex 2. 
Our exercise is purely quantitative and presents the advantage of being objective and transparent. 
However, laws may be more or less influential. For instance, the Italian parliament has traditionally 
made frequent use of the so called leggine ("small laws"), targeted at satisfying very narrow and   12 
specific, often local, interests (Spotts and Wieser 1986). The approach followed in this paper does not 
permit to assess the quality of legislation, but, if one assumes that differences in the relevance and 
effectiveness of  legislative acts are randomly distributed across policy areas, this problem becomes 
much less severe, since we use very large samples and thus can reasonably rely upon the law of large 
numbers (Alesina et al. 2005b). 
Tables 7 and 8 provide an overview of the legislative activity of the State, the EU, and the Region-5 
in the various sectors. A further category, termed  Institutional provisions, is added for practical 
reasons, namely to ensure that all legislative acts can be classified. This is not a real policy sector, but a 
residual category covering all those norms concerning the internal functioning and organisation of the 
institutions (including elections and referenda), which could not enter the other policy areas. The bulk 
of State's activity is in Citizen and social protection (27.6%), International relations (17.8%), Sectoral 
business relations (17.3%), Money and fiscal (12.0%) and Education, research and culture (11.7%). 
The fall in the number laws passed in 1995-2005 mainly came from  Citizen and social protection 
(especially  Health, employment and social protection), Sectoral business relations and  Money and 
fiscal, while International relations registered a considerable increase. With regard to the EU, almost 
90% of its legislation is concentrated in just two areas:  Agriculture and fisheries (54.7%)11 and 
International trade (33.5%). It is interesting to note the increase in International relations in 1984-94, 
mainly due to the development of tools such as association or cooperation agreements and financial 
assistance to third countries12, and in Citizen and social protection (notably in Health, employment and 
social protection) and Money and macro policy in 1995-2005, as a result of the new competences in 
social and economic policy attributed to the E U by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. The 
Region-5 are active, above all, in Citizen and social protection (25.7%), Sectoral business relations 
(18.4%),  Money and macro policy (17.4%)13 and  Education, research and culture (15.6%). The 
number of laws experienced a decline in all categories in 1995-2005, but it was particularly sharp in 
Health, employment and social protection.  
<Tables 7 and 8 here> 
The basic data presented so far can only give a partial and quite fragmented picture of the 
involvement of the State, the EU and the Region-5 in the various policy domains. In particular, they do 
not yet enable us to effectively compare the activity of the three levels of government in a specific 
sector, because the size of their legislative production is very different (6124 laws for the State, 61325 
for the EU, 8944 for the Region-5). To do so, we construct a few summary indicators whose values 
depend on the relative weights of the nine policy categories14 for each level of government, but not on   13 
the absolute number of legislative acts. Such indicators permit us to extend our analysis and answer the 
following questions: in what categories is the activity of each level of government more intense, both in 
absolute terms and in comparison with the other levels? What are the most heavily regulated sectors? In 
which areas are competences actually more shared between different levels of government or more 
exclusively exercised by a single level?  
We proceed in two steps. First, following the methodology proposed by Alesina et al. (2005b), we 
create a new indicator for each of the three level of governments, termed  ITA,  EU and  REG 
respectively, by dividing the number of laws in each of the nine policy categories in Table 7 by the 
column mean (reported in the last row of Table 7) and then normalising such new values so that the 
column mean in Table 9 equals 1 (columns 1, 2 and 3).15 Hence a value above (below) 1 indicates large 
(small) legislative activity of the corresponding level of government in a certain area. We term this 
feature "absolute involvement" (Table 10).  
Afterwards, we construct three more indicators (Table 9, columns 4, 5 and 8): arithmetic mean (A), 
geometric mean (G) and minimum value (M), defined as follows: 
 
 A = (ITA+EU+REG)/3                                                                                                                          (3) 
3 * * = REG EU ITA G                                      (4) 
M = min (ITA; EU; REG)                            (5) 
 
We also calculate M and G with respect to ITA and EU only, and ITA and REG only (Table 9, 
columns 6, 7, 9, 10). The values of A, M, and G are normalised so that their column mean in Table 9 
equals 1.16 The three indicators serve different purposes. A performs two functions: first, it provides a 
measure of  how heavily "regulated" a policy sector is, irrespective of which levels of government 
actually legislate in it (the column labelled TOTAL in Table 10); second, by comparing its value to 
those of ITA, EU and REG, we may evaluate the "relative involvement" of each level of government in 
a certain category, i.e. whether its legislative activity is more or less intense than that category's 
average (Table 11).17 By contrast, both G and M measure the intensity of the joint legislative activity of 
all the levels of government considered;18 the former indicator gives equal weight to the values of ITA, 
EU and  REG, whereas the latter only takes into account the smallest among them. We use their 
arithmetic mean to assess whether legislative competence is shared among  the three levels of 
government (or between two of them) or exclusively exerted by a single level of government (Table 
12).   14 
<Tables 9-10-11-12 here> 
The main findings for each policy sector can be summarised as follows: 
International trade: this category offers the clearest example of EU’s exclusive competence; the EU’s 
involvement is very high (both in absolute and relative terms), but, since the role of the State is 
negligible and that of the regions is nil, this policy sector presents, as a whole, a medium degree of 
regulation. 
Common market: it shows many similarities to International trade (almost exclusive EU’s competence, 
limited role of the State, no role for the regions), but the EU’s absolute involvement is very low and 
thus the degree of regulation is very low too.  
Money and fiscal: in both  Money and macro policy and  Taxation, the EU’s absolute and relative 
involvement are very low; Money and macro policy is shared between the State and the regions and is a 
highly regulated sector, with a higher involvement of the regions;  Taxation is of almost exclusive 
State’s competence and presents a low degree of regulation. 
Education, research and culture: the competence in this category is mainly shared between the State 
and the Regions, with a higher involvement of the latter; the EU plays a very small role and the overall 
degree of regulation is medium. 
Environment: this is a lowly regulated sector, where the main role is played by the regions, which 
display a medium absolute involvement, while the presence of the State and the EU is much lower.  
Sectoral business relations: competences in all three subcategories are highly shared among the three 
levels of government; Agriculture and fisheries is the only policy area where the absolute involvement 
of the EU, the State and the regions is high or very high and therefore it is very highly regulated; in 
relative terms, the EU's involvement is however much higher than that of the other two levels; both 
Industry and energy and Transport show a high absolute involvement of the State and the regions and a 
low one of the EU; the former sector is characterised by a medium degree of regulation, the latter by a 
high one. 
Non-sectoral business relations: this category is mainly of State’s competence, with some role played 
also by the regions, whereas the EU’s involvement is very low; however, the overall degree of 
regulation is very low. 
International relations: the competence in this area is partially shared between the State and the EU, 
with high absolute and relative involvements of the former and small ones of the latter; the role of the 
regions is negligible and the overall degree of regulation is low.   15 
Citizen and social protection: the situations of the three subcategories are rather different, even if the 
EU's involvement in all of them is low or very low; Justice and migration is a highly regulated sector, 
shared between the State and the regions, which are both highly involved in it; Health, employment and 
social protection is highly shared among the three levels of government and very highly regulated, with 
a high involvement of the State and the regions; finally,  Regional aid  presents a low degree of 
regulation and is mainly of State's competence.   
The overall picture emerging from our analysis suggests two main remarks. Firstly, whereas the 
situation in some areas (such as International trade or Education, research and culture) is in line with 
the previous normative recommendations, in too many policy sectors competences appear to be really 
shared among the three levels of government, contrary to what the economic theory would suggest. 
This is especially true for Agriculture and fisheries, Industry and energy and Health, employment and 
social protection. The first area is particularly interesting, not much because of the very large role of 
the EU, which is well documented in the literature, but just because, despite it, also the State and the 
regions intervene heavily. The lack of clarity stemming from the joint involvement of different levels 
of government in too many areas may make it difficult for citizens to understand "who actually does 
what".19 Secondly, in spite of an extensive transfer of competence to the EU and to the regions, the 
legislative role of the State in Italy is still crucial in most sectors. This i s broadly consistent with an 
intergovernmentalist view of the European integration process (Moravcsik 1998, Milward 2000) and 
contrast with the vision of a "Europe of the Regions" predicted by some observers a few years ago (for 
instance, Drèze 1993), where increasing international economic integration would possibly lead to 





This article has analysed the legislative production of the EU, the Italian parliament and the Italian 
regions in various policy sectors over the last three decades, in order to evaluate the effects of two 
phenomena occurred in Italy almost at the same time: the progressive transfer of powers to a 
supranational entity like the EU and the move to regional autonomy. The main findings have shown 
that European and national legislations (but not regional and national legislations) are, to a certain 
extent, substitutes and that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different 
levels of government.   16 
From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but 
only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. 
When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the 
distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not 
only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to 
understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a 
certain policy when they vote in national, local or European elections or in referenda on national or 
European constitutional issues. 
This latter remark raises relevant issues of accountability in modern democracies. An unclear 
allocation of competences, on the one side, makes politically convenient for the central government to 
criticise the EU  for unpopular domestic decisions (the “blame Brussels” strategy, in press jargon); on 
the other, if a regional government is run by a different coalition of parties than that supporting the 
central government, it provides a strong incentive for the former to blame the latter (or vice-versa) in 
case of some local political problems or policy failures. However, such strategies can become very 
costly, because, when they are called to express their opinion, citizens may even block the political 
processes promoting European integration or regional autonomy through their vote.20 In the last few 
years, the issue of the optimum allocation of competences is therefore likely to become not only of 
increasing academic interest, but also more and more pressing for policy-makers.  
Finally, our research could be extended to other EU countries characterised by a federal structure or 
strong regional autonomy (such as Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom). This would permit to make 
interesting comparisons and probably to generalise our findings about the relations among national, 
supranational and sub-national levels of government in Europe. 
 
Notes 
1. Throughout the paper, we will define the sub-national level in Italy as the regions, since more local levels of government 
(provinces and municipalities) have no legislative power. 
2. See Ruta (2005) for a detailed survey of this strand of literature. 
3. An excellent survey of fiscal federalism can be found in Oates (1999). 
4. The years in parentheses refer to the entry into force of the treaties. 
5. Even if it has not entered into force, the European Constitution provides a very useful classification of the present system 
of EU competences. 
6. In Italy, since 1989, most directives are implemented in the following way: parliament passes an ordinary law, known as 
legge comunitaria (“Community Act”), delegating the government to adopt the necessary measures by means of legislative 
decrees or other instruments (Rescigno 2005).     17 
7. This category is composed of three small regions located at the northern borders of the country, with a large presence of 
ethnic and linguistic minorities (Valle d'Aosta, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige) plus the two largest Italian 
islands (Sardinia and Sicily). 
8. This reform became fully operative in May 2003 after the passing by parliament of the so called “La Loggia Act” (see 
Bordignon and Cerniglia 2004 for more details).  
9. We also tried to include other political variables in the equations, namely the existence of a centre-left or centre-right 
majority in parliament and the use of proportional or majority electoral rules. However they not only prove insignificant, but 
also suffered from serious problems of multicollinearity with the other explanatory variables. 
10. The correlation coefficient between the annual number of laws passed by the Region-5 and those passed by all the 20 
regions in the 1973-2005 period is 0.90. 
11. As pointed out by Alesina and Spolaore (2003, p.240), such an impressive figure also reflects the high degree of 
specificity and detail of EU legislation in this sector.   
12. Relations with Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 probably represent the most prominent example. 
13. This surprisingly high figure is chiefly due to budget laws and their frequent amendments during the financial year and 
to laws approving the budget of various regional administrative bodies. 
14. Institutional provisions is excluded from the following analysis because it is a category not corresponding to a real 
policy sector. 
15. Sub-categories' values are normalised so that their mean equals the value of the indicator for their own category. 
16. As before, sub-categories' values are normalised so that their mean equals the value of the indicator for their own 
category. 
17. A level of government may show, at the same time, a low absolute involvement and a high relative involvement (or vice 
versa) in a certain sector; this is the case, for instance, of the EU in the Common market category (see below). 
18. Both indicators score 0 in a certain category if at least one level of government is not involved in legislative activity. 
19. A notable exception to such pattern is Environment, the area in which the involvement of all three levels of government 
would probably be most justified according to the economic theory, where, by contrast, the role of the regions is clearly 
predominant. 
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Annex 1. Allocation of legislative competences between the State and the regions in Italy 
 
  AFTER 2001  BEFORE 2001 
State's exclusive legislative competence  1) foreign policy and international 
relations of the State; relations of the 
State with the European Union; right of 
asylum and legal status of the citizens 
of States not belonging to the European 
Union; 
2) immigration; 
3) relations between the republic and 
religious denominations; 
4) defence and armed forces; state 
security; weapons, ammunitions and 
explosives; 
5) money, protection of savings, 
financial markets; protection of 
competition; currency system; state 
taxation system and accounting; 
equalization of regional financial 
resources; 
6) state organs and their electoral laws; 
state referenda; election of the 
European Parliament; 
7) organization and administration of 
the State and of national public bodies; 
8) law,  order and security, aside from 
the local administrative police; 
9) citizenship, registry of personal 
status and registry of residence; 
10) jurisdiction and procedural laws; 
civil and criminal law; administrative 
tribunals; 
11) determination of the basic standards 
of welfare related to those civil and 
social rights that must be guaranteed in 
the entire national territory; 
12) general rules on education; 
13) social security; 
14) electoral legislation, local 
government and fundamental functions 
of municipaliti es, provinces and 
metropolitan cities; 
15) customs, protection of national 
boundaries and international 
Any matters not expressly reserved to 
concurrent legislation   20 
prophylactic measures; 
16) weights, units of measurement and 
time standards; coordination of the 
informative, statistical and information-
technology aspects of the data of the 
state, regional and local 
administrations; intellectual property; 
17) protection of the environment, of 
the ecosystem and of the cultural 
heritage. 
Shared legislative competence 
(concurrent legislation) 
1) international and European Union 
relations of the regions;  
2) foreign trade;  
3) protection and safety of labour;  
4) education, without infringement of 
the autonomy of schools and other 
institutions, and with the exception of 
vocational training;  
5) professions;  
6) scientific and technological research 
and support for innovation in the 
productive sectors;  
7) health protection;  
8) food;  
9) sports regulations;  
10) disaster relief service;  
11) land-use regulation and planning;  
12) harbours and civil airports;  
13) major transportation and navigation 
networks;  
14) regulation of media and 
communication;  
15) production, transportation and 
national distribution of energy;  
16) complementary and integrative 
pensions systems;  
17) harmonization of the budgetary 
rules of the public sector and 
coordination of the public finance and 
the taxation system;  
18) promotion of the environmental and 
cultural heritage, and promotion and 
organization of cultural activities; 
19) savings banks, rural co-operative 
banks, regional banks;  
20) regional institutions for credit to 
agriculture and land development. 
1) organization of regional offices and 
administrative bodies;  
2) local urban and rural police; 
3) fairs and markets; 
4) public charity and health care and 
hospitals; 
5) craft schools, vocational training and 
educational assistance; 
6) local museums and libraries; 
7) urban planning; 
8) tourism and hotel industry; 
9) tramlines and motorways of regional 
interest; 
10) roads, waterworks and public works 
of regional interest; 
11) lake navigation and harbours;   
12) mineral and thermal waters; 
13) quarries and peat-bogs; 
14) hunting; 
15) fishing in internal waters; 
16) agriculture and forests; 
17) handicrafts; 




Regions' exclusive legislative 
competence 
Any matters not expressly reserved to 
state law. 
- 
*According to legislative decree 616/77, the regions might legislate in all matters in which administrative functions were 
delegated to them by the State. In addition to those mentioned in the Constitution, some more matters were thus included, 
especially in the environmental and cultural sectors. 
Source: Italian Constitution (Art. 117) 
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Annex 2. Data sources and summary statistics 
 
Data on EU legislation are taken from the  EUR-Lex database, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/en/index.htm. For the breakdown into policy categories, see the classification in Alesina et al. 
(2005: 316-17). Only the two following modifications have been applied: Money and macro policy also 
includes category 01.6 and Institutional provisions includes categories 01.1-5.  
Data on national legislation comes from the UTET  LEX + CODEX database, available at 
http://www.utetgiuridica.it/. Legislative acts have then been reclassified by the author to match the 
policy categories as defined in the paper.   
Data on regional laws is from the House of Representatives (Camera dei Deputati) database, available 
at http://camera.ancitel.it/lrec. Since no classification is provided by the database, regional laws have 
been directly classified by the author according to the policy categories as defined in the paper.  
Table A.1 displays the summary statistics of variables employed in the regressions presented in section 
4. 
<Table A.1 here>   22 
Table 1. Allocation of competences: normative recommendations from the economic literature  
 
  EU level  National level  Sub-national level 
International trade  X     
Common Market  X     
Money and fiscal       
Money and macro policy  X  X  x 
taxation    X  X 
Education, research, culture  x  X  X 
Environment  X  X  X 
Sectoral business relations       
agriculture and fisheries    X   
industry and energy    X   
transport  x  X  X 
Non-sectoral business relations  X     
International relations  X  X   
Citizen and social Protection       
justice and migration  x  X  X 
health, employment and social protection    X  X 
regional aid    X   
X = large role; x = small or supporting role; 
Source: adapted from Breuss and Eller (2004) and Alesina et al. (2005b)   23 
 
Table 2. Evolution of the EU's policy responsibilities (1970-2005) 
  Policy category  1970  1987  1993  2005 
1   International trade   4  4  4  4 
2  Common Market         
2a   harmonization of legislation  4  4  4  4 
2b  four freedoms   3  3  3  3 
3   Money and fiscal          
3a  Money and macro policy policy          
  money  1  2  3  4 
  macroeconomic policy  1  1  2  2 
3b  Taxation          
  direct  1  1  1  1 
  indirect & common market   1  3  3  3 
4  Education, research, culture         
4a   education and research   1  2  2  2 
4b  culture  1  1  2  2 
5   Environment   1  3  3  3 
6   Sectoral business relations          
6a  Agriculture and fishery   3  3  3  3 
6b  Industry    1  2  2  2 
  Energy  1  1  3  3 
6c  Transport   1  3  3  3 
7   Non-sectoral business relations 
(competition/subsidies/company law)  
3  3  3  3 
8   International relations          
8a  foreign policy  1  2  3  3 
  defence  1  1  2  2 
  foreign aid  2  2  2  2 
9   Citizen and social protection          
9a  Justice and migration  1  1  2  3 
9b  Health, employment and social protection         
  consumer protection  1  1  3  3 
  health   1  1  2  2 
  employment  1  1  1  2 
  social protection  2  3  3  3 
9c  Regional aid  1  3  3  3 
1=States' exclusive competence 2=Complementary competence 3=Shared competence 4=EU's exclusive competence 
Source: adapted from European Convention (2002a) and EC/EU Treaties.   24 
Table 3. Actual allocation of competences  
  EU  STATE  REGIONS 
International trade  X  x  x 
Common Market  X  x   
Money and fiscal       
Money and macro policy  X  X  X 
taxation  x  X  X 
Education, research, culture  x  X  X 
Environment  X  X  X 
Sectoral business relations       
agriculture and fisheries  X  X*  X* 
industry and energy  X  X**  X** 
transport  X  X  X 
Non-sectoral business relations  X  X  x 
International relations  X  X  x 
Citizen and social protection       
justice and migration  X  X  X 
health, employment and social protection  X  X  X 
regional aid  X  X   
X = large role; x = small or supporting role. Characters in bold indicate discrepancy with the desired allocation of 
competences as defined in Table YY. 
* In Italy, before the 2001 constitutional reform, competence in Agriculture and fisheries was shared between the State and 
the regions; afterwards, the regions have been granted exclusive competence in such area, with the important exception of 
food.   
** In Italy, before the 2001 constitutional reform, the State had exclusive competence in Industry and energy, with the 
notable exception of handicrafts; afterwards, the regions have been attributed exclusive competence in Industry (including 
handicrafts), while Energy has become an area of shared competence. 
Source: EC/EU Treaties and Italian Constitution 
 
Table 4. Number of laws passed by the State, the EU and the regions 
  1973-83  1984-94  1995-2005  Total (1973-2005) 
State  2246  2218  1660  6124 
EU  15436  16974  28915  61325 
Regions  13646  11735  9261  34642 
EU/State  6.9  7.7  17.4  10.0 
Regions/Italy  6.1  5.3  5.6  5.7 
Source: see Annex 2 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix of variables 
 
  LAW_ITA  LAW_EU  LAW_REG  EARLY_EL  REGULAR_EL  EL 
LAW_ITA  1           
LAW_EU  -0.410  1         
LAW_REG  0.396  -0.516  1       
EARLY_EL  -0.433  -0.186  0.209  1     
REGULAR_EL  -0.121  0.129  -0.259  -0.119  1   
EL  -0.457  -0.095  0.043  -  -  1 
Source: own calculations   25 
Table 6. Estimation results  
 
Dependent Variable: LAW_ITA 
Method: OLS with White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors 























(16.477)*   
EARLY_EL   
-69.616 
(18.618)* 
REGULAR_EL   
-12.190 
(10.203) 
     
Adjusted R-squared  0.407  0.456 
N observations  33  33 
F-statistic  8.321  7.702 
Ljung-Box Q-statistics (?²(5))  2.660  3.997 
* significant at 1% level 
Summary statistics are reported in Annex 2 
Source: own calculations 
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Table 7. Sectoral breakdown of legislative acts passed by the three levels of government (1973-2005)  
  Number of laws  % of total 
  STATE  EU  REGION-5  STATE  EU  REGION-5 
International trade  15  20522  0  0.2%  33.5%  0.0% 
Common Market  81  1247  0  1.3%  2.0%  0.0% 
Money and fiscal  734  437  1697  12.0%  0.7%  19.0% 
Money and macro policy  352  295  1558  5.7%  0.5%  17.4% 
Taxation  382  142  139  6.2%  0.2%  1.6% 
Education, research, culture  714  107  1399  11.7%  0.2%  15.6% 
Environment  200  507  1044  3.3%  0.8%  11.7% 
Sectoral business relations  1061  34677  1642  17.3%  56.5%  18.4% 
Agriculture and fisheries  336  33554  656  5.5%  54.7%  7.3% 
Industry and energy  287  562  418  4.7%  0.9%  4.7% 
Transport  438  561  568  7.2%  0.9%  6.4% 
Non-sectoral business relations  228  298  264  3.7%  0.5%  3.0% 
International relations  1093  1839  40  17.8%  3.0%  0.4% 
Citizen and social protection  1693  1291  2302  27.6%  2.1%  25.7% 
Justice and migration  588  157  546  9.6%  0.3%  6.1% 
Health, employment and social protection  823  930  1756  13.4%  1.5%  19.6% 
Regional aid  282  204  0  4.6%  0.3%  0.0% 
Institutional provisions  304  399  556  5.0%  0.7%  6.2% 
TOTAL  6124  61325  8944  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Mean*  646.6  6769.4  932.0       
*Excluding Institutional provisions 
Source: see Annex 2   27 
Table 8. Sectoral and temporal breakdown of legislative activity (1973-2005) 
  State  EU  Region-5 
  1973-83  1984-94  1995-2005  1973-83  1984-94  1995-2005  1973-83  1984-94  1995-2005 
International trade  5  9  1  7878  5739  6905  0  0  0 
Common Market  26  47  8  336  477  435  0  0  0 
Money and fiscal  290  281  163  111  0  326  598  617  482 
Money and macro policy  99  161  92  71  45  179  554  564  440 
Taxation  191  120  71  40  52  50  44  53  42 
Education, research, culture  222  270  222  13  22  72  583  504  312 
Environment  63  72  65  67  177  263  381  410  253 
Sectoral business relations  477  374  210  7784  11567  15326  813  521  308 
Agriculture and fisheries  161  117  58  7381  11331  14842  352  205  99 
Industry and energy  123  104  60  306  73  184  172  146  100 
Transport  193  153  92  98  163  300  289  170  109 
Non-sectoral business relations  86  86  56  25  72  202  79  98  87 
International relations  294  341  458  118  845  876  2  24  14 
Citizen and social protection  684  607  402  139  254  898  1006  861  435 
Justice and migration  199  214  175  0  15  142  202  205  139 
Health, employment and social 
protection 
363  288  172  108  189  633  804  656  296 
Regional aid  122  105  55  31  50  123  0  0  0 
Institutional provisions  99  130  75  63  97  239  201  195  160 
TOTAL  2246  2218  1660  16557  19347  25421  3663  3230  2051 
Source: see Annex 2 
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Table 9. Main summary indicators of legislative activity (1973-2005)  
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
          G  G  G  M  M  M 
  ITA  EU  REG  A  TOTAL   ITA-EU  ITA-REG  TOTAL   ITA-EU  ITA-REG 
International trade  0.02  3.01  0.00  1.05  0.00  0.44  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00 
Common Market  0.12  0.18  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.45  0.00 
Money and fiscal  1.08  0.06  1.71  0.99  0.91  0.45  1.59  0.29  0.24  1.46 
Money and macro policy  1.03  0.09  3.14  1.48  1.33  0.52  2.42  0.39  0.33  2.30 
Taxation  1.12  0.04  0.28  0.50  0.48  0.38  0.75  0.19  0.16  0.62 
Education, research, culture  1.05  0.02  1.41  0.86  0.53  0.22  1.42  0.07  0.06  1.42 
Environment  0.29  0.07  1.05  0.49  0.52  0.25  0.65  0.34  0.28  0.40 
Sectoral business relations  1.56  5.09  1.65  2.88  4.35  4.84  1.87  7.06  5.95  2.12 
Agriculture and fisheries  1.48  14.77  1.98  6.33  8.85  11.46  2.01  15.88  13.39  2.11 
Industry and energy  1.27  0.25  1.26  0.96  1.85  1.37  1.48  2.66  2.24  1.80 
Transport  1.93  0.25  1.71  1.35  2.36  1.69  2.13  2.65  2.23  2.44 
Non-sectoral business relations  0.34  0.04  0.27  0.22  0.29  0.21  0.35  0.20  0.17  0.36 
International relations  1.61  0.27  0.04  0.67  0.48  1.13  0.30  0.18  1.03  0.05 
Citizen and social protection  2.49  0.19  2.32  1.73  1.90  1.18  2.80  0.86  0.72  3.14 
Justice and migration  2.59  0.07  1.65  1.50  1.43  0.76  2.69  0.37  0.26  2.95 
Health, employment and social protection  3.63  0.41  5.30  3.24  4.27  2.18  5.72  2.20  1.56  6.48 
Regional aid  1.24  0.09  0.00  0.46  0.00  0.60  0.00  0.00  0.34  0.00 
Source: own calculations 
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Table 10. The "absolute involvement" of the three level of governments in legislative activity* 
  STATE  EU  REGION-5  TOTAL 
International trade  very low  very high  nil  medium 
Common Market  very low  very low  nil  very low 
Money and fiscal         
Money and macro policy  medium   very low  very high  high 
Taxation  medium   very low  low  low 
Education, research, 
culture 
medium   very low  high  medium 
Environment  low  very low  medium   low 
Sectoral business relations         
Agriculture and fisheries  high  very high  high  very high 
Industry and energy  high  low  high  medium 
Transport  high  low  high  high 
Non-sectoral business 
relations 
low  very low  low  very low 
International relations  high  low  very low  low 
Citizen and social 
protection 
       
Justice and migration  very high  very low  high  high 
Health, employment and 
social protection 
very high  low  very high  very high 
Regional aid  medium   very low  nil  low 
*TOTAL is given by the arithmetic mean of ITA, EU and REG. The degree of "absolute involvement" is calculated as 
follows. Let "x i" (i=ITA, EU, REG, TOTAL) be the value of indicator i in each policy sector. If x i<0.25 then "very low"; if 
0.25=xi<0.75 then "low"; if 0.75=xi<1.25 then "medium"; if 1.25=xi<2.5 then "high"; if xi=2.5 then "very high" 
Source: own calculations 
 
Table 11. The "relative involvement" of the three level of governments in legislative activity* 
  STATE  EU  REGION-5 
International trade  very low  very high  nil 
Common Market  medium   high  nil 
Money and fiscal       
Money and macro policy  low  very low  high 
Taxation  high  very low  low 
Education, research, culture  medium   very low  high 
Environment  low  very low  high 
Sectoral business relations       
Agriculture and fisheries  very low  high  low 
Industry and energy  high  low  high 
Transport  high  very low  high 
Non-sectoral business 
relations 
high  very low  medium  
International relations  high  low  very low 
Citizen and social protection       
Justice and migration  high  very low  medium  
Health, employment and social 
protection 
medium   very low  high 
Regional aid  very high  very low  nil 
*The degree of "relative involvement" is calculated as follows. Let "x i" (i=ITA, EU, REG) be the value of indicator i in 
each policy sector. If x i<0.25*A then "very low"; if 0.25*A=xi<0.75*A then "low"; if 0.75*A=xi<1.25*A then "medium"; if 
1.25*A=xi<2.5*A then "high"; if xi=2.5*A then "very high" 
Source: own calculations   30 
Table 12. The degree of "competence sharing" between different levels of government*  
 
  EU + STATE + REGION-5  EU + STATE  STATE + REGION-5 
International trade  nil  low  nil 
Common Market  nil  low  nil 
Money and fiscal       
Money and macro policy  medium   low  high 
Taxation  low  low  low 
Education, research, culture  low  very low  high 
Environment  low  low  low 
Sectoral business relations       
Agriculture and fisheries  very high  very high  high 
Industry and energy  high  high  high 
Transport  very high  high  high 
Non-sectoral business relations  very low  very low  low 
International relations  low  medium   very low 
Citizen and social protection       
Justice and migration  medium   low  very high 
Health, employment and social 
protection 
very high  high  very high 
Regional aid  nil  low  nil 
*The degree of "competence sharing" is calculated as follows. Let GM = (G+M)/2 be the value of the mean of G and A in 
each policy sector. If GM<0.25 then "very low"; if 0.25=GM <0.75 then "low"; if 0.75=GM <1.25 then "medium"; if 1.25= 
GM <2.5 then "high"; if GM=2.5 then "very high"  
Source: own calculations 
 
 
Table A.1 Summary statistics of variables 
  Observations  Mean  St. Deviation  Min  Max 
LAW_ITA  33  185.7  47.7  102  274 
LAW_EU  33  1867.0  603.0  1168  3161 
LAW_REG  33  1052.6  221.2  538  1462 
EL  33  0.2  0.4  0  1 
EARLY_EL  33  0.2  0.4  0  1 
REGULAR_EL  33  0.1  0.2  0  1 
Source: own calculations 
 